We propose an integration of possibility the ory into non-classical logics. We obtain many formal results that generalize the case where possibility and necessity functions are based on classical logic. We show how useful such an approach is by applying it to reasoning un der uncertain and inconsistent information.
Introduction
Possibility theory has been widely used in Artificial In telligence to represent uncertain knowledge in a more qualitative way than, for example, probability theory: indeed, it is equivalent to work with "quantitative" possibility theory (which means using possibility and necessity measures and possibility distributions, which map formulas or worlds to [0, 1]) or with its qualitative counterpart (where qualitative necessity and possibil ity relations are preorders on the logical language and qualitative possibility distributions are just preorders on the set of worlds). Besides, its connection to vari ous qualitative formalisms in logic and Artificial Intel ligence has been established, notably with epistemic entrenchment relations in [DP 9la], conditional logics in [Bou 92 ] [F HL 94] , System Z in [BDP 92] . The use of possibility theory in Artificial Intelligence covers non monotonic reasoning [DP 91b ], belief revision, incon sistency handling, inheritance and default rules han dling, temporal reasoning, constraint satisfaction, .. .
In Knowledge Representation, many non-classical log ics have been used (note that in this paper we consider only non-classical logics sharing the same language as classical logic). Each of them was intended for some particular focus, a specific aspect of reasoning: E.g. paraconsistent logics have been used to deal with con tradictory knowledge bases. Or, intuitionistic logic has been used to take into account some subtle distinctions between statements involving double negation for ex ample. Or, Kleene's 3-valued logic {and other many valued logics) has been used to cope with statements for which neither truth nor falsity make sense. Now, possibility theory brings in something more that should be fruitfully exploited as complementary to such aspects of reasoning. Hence, we study how to integrate possibility theory with non-classical logics. Our work comes from the following two facts:
• even when the involved uncertainty has a possi bilistic nature, "classical" possibility theory may not be well-suited to the addressed problem, due to shortcomings, not of possibility theory itself but of classical logic, on which possibility theory is defined. For example, some problems require a formalization with a local view of inconsistency: this is impossible with classical possibility theory (we need a paraconsistent approach, cfSection 3).
• on the ot.her hand, non-standard logics such as intuitionistic logic, paraconsistent logics,. . . are not expressive enough to express uncertainty in a gradual way.
These arguments show that it is generally valuable to integrate non-classical logics with a numerical theory of uncertainty. Now, the reason why we focus in this paper on possibility theory rather than another theory of uncertainty, is its qualitative nature (as it amounts to a "numerical account" of preordering relations over formulas or worlds), which should make it a priori sim pler to generalize than more quantitative approaches such as probability theory or belief functions.
The methodology we follow in this paper consists of going from the general case to the particular case:
• in Section 2, we investigate whether, and under which conditions, important properties of possi bility theory remain valid when generalized. We state the results in the most general case to make the study "reusable", though the applications de veloped in Section 3 focus on paraconsistency.
• in Section 3, we take a case study, that is, we choose a paraconsistent logic (namely Ct) and dis cuss more practical applications to reasoning with uncertain and inconsistent information.
*Research supported by CNRS in project "Gestion de l'evolutif et l'incertain dans une ba.$e de connaissances". 
Necessity /possibility functions
The natural presentation of necessity and possibility functions (see [Zad 78 ] for instance) shows that pos sibility theory consists in meta-level definitions over classical logic, which respect completely the structure of classical logic.
This suggests that similar functions could be defined on other logics than classical logic; so, replacing (.C,I-)
where L is a given non-classical logic, we can look for a definition of possibility /necessity functions on the logic L. We deal with classical propositional1 languages, built from a list of propositional variables -sometimes required to be finite -, and the connec tives -., 1\, V, �, <-> (where 1-L 9 <--> t/; is a shorthand for 1-L 9 -+ t/; and 1-L t/; -+ ¥' ). The only vary ing parameter is then the consequence relation f-L.
We now give a generic definition of non-classical ne cessity /possibility functions, of which the usual ne cessity /possibility functions correspond to the special case where L is classical logic (Section 3 deals with the special case where L is the paraconsistent logic Cr).
Definition: let .C be a classical propositional language and 1-L a consequence relation, L being a given (maybe non-classical) logic. A L-necessity function is a map ping N from .C to [0, 1] satisfying the following axioms2
When L is classical logic, we recover the classical ne cessity functions. Whatever the logic L is, the follow ing property always entails (Eq): 
Whatever the logic L, the next property entails (Eqn):
(Domn) iff-L 9--+ t/; then II('P)::; II(t/;) Proposition 2: (Domrr) is entailed by (Eqrr) and (Disj) on condition that f-L satisfies:
Some properties of non-classical necessity /possibility functions Some questions we may ask are: how can (D1) and (D2) carry over to L-necessity and L-possibility func tions? When are (Dl) and (D2) equivalent?
and the following inference rules
then (D1) and (D2) hold.
Note that among non-classical logics admitting (1)- (3) and the above two inference rules (modus ponens and contraposition), there are various relevant logics such as the logic E [AB 75]. Let us now have a look on necessary conditions for having (D1) (or (D2)). 
Definition: a logic L is said to admit trivialisation of truth-functional valuations iff any truth-functional 
Again, an example of a logic satisfying these properties is the logic E [AB 75]. On the other hand, intuitionistic logic and paraconsistent logics do not.
Proposition 7: let L be a logic satisfying (1) to (8) and f a truth-functional valuation monotonic w .r .t.
f-L. Then we have ffi = max and ® = min.
Proposition 8: let L be a logic satisfying (1) to (8) and excluded middle, and f a truth-functional valua tion on L monotonic w.r.t. f-.L· Then, Vcp, f(<p) = 1* or f(-,cp) = 1•, where 1• = sup{/('P),cp E C } .
Proposition 9: let L be a logic satisfying (1)- (8) and non-contradiction and f a truth-functional valuation monotonic w.r.t. 1-£. Then Vcp,/(cp) = 0* or f(-,IP) = o• where 0* = inf{f(cp),ip E £}.
Corollary 10: any logic satisfying (1) to {8), excluded middle and non-contradiction admits trivialisation of truth-functional valuations.
2.3

Semantics of L-necessity /possibility functions
With the assumption that C is built from a fi nite number of propositional variables, "classical " neces sity /possibility functions can be semantically defined by means of possibility distributions: a possibility dis tribution 7r is simply a function from the set n of all in terpretations for L to (0, 1]. The necessity function in duced by 1r is defined by N ( 'P ) = inf{1-7r(w) /w f= ''P} (with the convention inf 0 = 1 that we take in all the paper as well as sup 0 = 0). It can then be proved that N is a necessity measure, and that any necessity measure is induced by a possibility distribution.
We now turn to the general case of a logic L for which the class of L-models is written nL.
Definition: a L-possibility distribution is a mapping 1r from �h to [0, 1] . It is said to be normalized iff
In classical logic, due to the equivalence between v li: 'P and v f= -.cp, the two following definitions for inducing a C-necessity function from a C-possibility distribution are e quivalent:
Analogously, for possibitity functions:
Defi nition: JI{1r), /2{1r), /a (7r), / 4(1r) are the map pings from ,C to (0, 1] induced from 1r by:
It is straightforward from these definitions that the following duality properties hold:
, and /4(1r)(cp) � / 3(1r)(cp).
Proposition 12: ft is a L-necessity function, pro vided that the following conditions hold:
basically amounts to the validity of cp V •cp in the logic L.
Proposition 13: h is a 1-necessity function, pro vided that the following conditions hold:
h is a 1-possibility function, pro vided that the following conditions hold:
Proposition 15: J4 is a 1-possibility function, pro vided that the following conditions hold:
2.4
L-necessity orderings
It has been shown [Dub 86 ] that necessity and possi bility functions can be equivalently expressed in purely qualitative terms, with preordering relations.
We briefly give a generalization of this result, for the case of necessities (the case for possibilities is similar).
Definition: A 1-necessity ordering is a relation on .C satisfying the following properties:
• if rp 2:: 1/; and 1/; 2:: � then rp 2:: � (transitivity)
• if I-L 'P -+ '1/J then 1/; 2:: rp (dominance)
• rp 1\ tP � rp or rp 1\ tjJ � '1/J (conjunctiveness) Definition [Dub 86]: a relation 2:: on C is said to agree strictly with a mapping f from C to [0, 1] iff Vrp, 1/; E .C, we have 'P 2:: tP <:? !( rp ) 2:: f ( '1/J ).
Proposition 16 (correspondence between 1-necessity functions and 1-necessity orderings): the only map pings from .C to [0, 1] agreeing strictly with 1-necessity orderings and also satisfying (Taut) are 1-necessity functions.
3
Application to reasoning with uncertain and inconsistent However, these syntactical approaches do not have (yet) any semantics in terms of uncertainty measures. Now, using paraconsistent logics for handling incon sistent knowledge bases enables a local treatment of inconsistency, by locating the inconsistency on some formulas. Yet, these paraconsistent approaches do not allow for any graduality in the inconsistency, which im plies some loss of information if the initial knowledge was pertained with uncertainty.
While possibilistic logic allows for a gradual but global treatment of inconsistency, where conflicts are solved only by comparing the uncertainty level of the pieces of information with the inconsistency level of the knowl edge base, the pure paraconsistent approach localizes inconsistency, but conflicts cannot be ranked accord ing to uncertainty, importance, priority, normality as done in rank-based systems. Thus paraconsistency is not able to "solve" the conflicts. What we propose here is to apply the results of Section 2 to a given paraconsistent logic, namely C1 [daC 74], to handle both uncertain and inconsistent knowledge, and with a local treatment of inconsistency. We now give two motivating examples, one about fusion of uncertain information (multi-source reasoning) and one about reasoning with default rules.
Example 1 (multi�source reasoning) This example is borrowed from [Cho 94]. Two witnesses report their observations about a mur derer. Witness 1 (noted W1) is certain that the mur derer was a woman with blond hair, and believes (with some uncertainty) that she was wearing a Chanel suit, glasses, and was driving a BMW. Witness 2 (noted W2) is certain that the murderer was a woman with brown hair and that she was not wearing glasses, and believes (with some uncertainty) that she was driving a Fiat. What would we like to conclude about the following statements?
• Both witnesses agree that the murderer was fe male and are completely sure; so we want to con clude the murderer was female.
• No contradiction either about wear-Chanel-suit since witness 2 does not know anything.
• Strong contradiction about the colour of the mur derer's hair; we wish to conclude neither blond nor brown but we want to keep in mind that these literals are "strongly subject to inconsis tency" (knowing the constraint •(blond-hair 1\ brown-hair)).
• Contradiction about wear-glasses: the contradic tion is weaker than the one above since witness 1 is unsure; moreover, since witness 2's information is prioritary to witness 1 's we would like to solve the confl ict (by concluding •wear-glasses).
• Weak contradiction again, about the car; however, since both witnesses are equally certain, we do not want to conclude anything. .6.0 = {bird ---. fly, bird ---+ wings}.
Adding the fact penguin to .6. enables us to infer •fly but wings is not deduced (it is "drown" by the incon sistency appearing at rank 1). This particular case of the drowning effect is known as the property of "in heritance blocking".
Considering .6. as a set of formulas for the logic C1, we obtain AU {penguin} f-c, {fly, •fly, wings}.
Thus, we avoid the drowning effect but we do not take into account priorities (induced by specificity) such as penguin .... ..,.
•fly over bird .... ..,. fly and we conclude that fly is not well-behaved.
What we would like is to take advantage of the lo calisation of inconsistency, as done by paraconsistent entailment, and the priority between formulas, which would lead us to infer {fly, wings} but not •fly.
Note that prioritized syntax-based approaches based on the selection of maximal consistent subsets of the knowledge base guided by the priorities solve the drowning effect but do not tell anything about where the contradictions are localized; so, for instance, the conclusion •wear-glasses is not relativised by the fact that it is (weakly) subject to inconsistency. A valuation-based semantics for C 1 (Alv 84] is given in Section 3.2.3 as we now reproduce the original ax iomatic presentation of C1 that consists of the next ten axioms Regarding notation, we use <p0 as an abbreviation for --,( <p 1\ •<p). In the next two sections, we also use # to denote any of 1\, V, ---+ . 
(P9) N is a classical necessity function if and only if N(t.p0) = 1 for all t.p N(-,t.p0) = min(N('P),N(-.t.p)) is the necessity of t.p "behaving badly"; it can be seen as a measure of the inconsistency inherent in t.p. C1-necessity functions en able us to rank the formulas not only with respect to their certainty, but also with respect to their inherent inconsistency: N( ''Po) gives a notion of inconsistency which is both local and gradual. We recover of course as particular cases:
• Classical necessity functions, so that N (''Po) = N(.l) for all t.p. The notion of inconsistency is still gradual but global.
• Classical C1-valuations, which verify N(-.t.p0) = 0 or N(..., t.p") = 1, for all t.p. The notion of inconsis tency is still local but not gradual.
3.2.3
C1-necessity functions: semantics
At fi rst, a (paraconsistent) Ct-valuation [Alv 84] is a mapping from .C to {0, 1} such that: We could have also defined C1-possibility functions, C1-necessity and possibility orderings, that we do not discuss for the sake of brevity. C1-necessity functions are sufficient to deal with the next section, devoted to the application to reasoning with uncertain and incon sistent knowledge.
3.3
Reasoning with C1 Mnecessity functions 3.3.1 Generalizing the principle of minimum specificity
The principle of minimum specifi city [DP 86] or equiv alently, minimum compact ranking [Pea 90] and ratio nal closure [Leh 89] (all these being equivalent, up to the language on which they are defined) induces, from a possibilistic knowledge base, a particular necessity function i.e. the smallest among all necessity functions satisfying the knowledge base. Thanks to the prop erty (P3), we are able to generalize the principle of minimum specificity to C1-necessity functions:
Definition: a C1-possibilistic knowledge base is a fi nite set KB = {(tp; a; ) , 1 � i � n } where if'; E .C and a; E [0, l] . A C1-necessity function N is said to satisfy K B iff Vi = l..n, N( lf'i ) ;::: a;.
Definition: the minimum specificity closure N KB of a C1-possibilistic knowledge base K B is the C1-necessity function defined by Vtj; E .C, Nxs(,P) = sup{,BIKB11I--c1 '1/J} where KB13 = {lf';\(!f'; ai) E KB and a;;:=: ,8}.
Proposition 17 (principle of minimum specifi city for C1-necessities): For any Ct-necessity function N, N satisfi es KB iff N;::: NxsMore generally, the minimum specifi city closure could be extended to any logic L satisfying the property (P3). Applying the principle of minimum specificity enables us to draw conclusions that taking into account the uncertainty and the inconsistency of the knowledge base. We propose the following definition of a conse quence relation:
Intuitively, we deduce '1/J from K B iff the certainty of '1/J is higher than the inconsistency inherent to '1/J, or equivalently, iff the certainty of 'lj; is higher than the certainty of •¢. The binary version of f---would be defined by if' f'--KB '1/J iff Nxs(t.p -+ ¢) > Nxs(l;? -+ •if0), or equivalently iff Nxs(t.p--+ ¢) > Nxs(IP -+ -,'CjJ). Note that f--is nonmonotonic; a more complete study of the properties of f---a Ia Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [KLM 90] , is possible with respect to the (monotonic) logic cl instead of classical logic.
Note that when N collapses to a classical necessity measure, we haveVt/;Nx8(-., P0) = N(..L) and f---is the class ical possibilistic consequence relation [DP 91 b].
Example (multi-source reasoning): let us return to the example of Section 3.1. Ta king some a E (0, 1 ):
N(female) = 1; N(brown) = 1; N(BMW) = a; N(Chanel) =a ; N(glasses) = u:.
• W2 (witness 2): N(female) = 1; N(-.brown) = 1; N(-.BMW) =a; N(-. glasses)= 1.
The fusion K B of these two knowledge bases gives the following minimum specificity closure:
• NKB(female) = 1; NKB(-.female) = 0; NxB(-.female0) = 0;
• NxB(brown) = 1; NKs(-.brown) = 1; NxB(-.brown°) = 1;
• NxB(BMW) = u:; NxB(-.BMW) =a;
• NxB(Chanel) =a; NKB(•Chanel) = 0; NxB(•Chanel0) = 0;
• NxB(glasses) = a; NKB(-.glasses) = 1; NxB(-.glasses0) = a. Applying the Z ranking procedure to Ll (written with the possibilistic ranking convention) gives the ranking: (for any a:, j3 such that 0 < j3 < a < 1) Lla = {penguin--+ bird, penguin---+ --,fly, fly---+ -.live-in-Antarctica}; �f3 = {bird ---+ fly, bird ---+ wings}.
Then, taking the C1-minimum specifi city closure of K B = {penguin} U � leads to Here is a revised definition, more suited to handling default rules:
Definition: Let K B = FULl, where F is a set of facts and Ll = {'P i --+ 1/;i, i = l..n} a set of default rules, where each rule is assigned a necessity degree corresponding to its Z-ranking. We define G 1 (Ll) = {penguin, bird---+ fly, bird--+ wings, penguin ---+ bird, penguin --+ --,fly}.
Clearly, G00(Ll) = G1(6.). Therefore, Ll f---• •fly. Also, Ll r-• bird and 6. f---1 wings. Contrastedly, Ll �· •live-in-Antarctica.
Conclusion
We have given some basic results describing what re mains and what changes when switching from classi cal possibility theory to possibility theory over a non classical logic. We have then focused on a case study, namely the paraconsistent logic C1, and showed how to use it to reason with inconsistent and uncertain infor mation. What has been left aside in this paper is the other possible applications of possibility theory over non-classical logics: first, one could think of applying the general results of Section 2 to other non-classical logics: for instance, introducing possibility and ne cessity valuations into intuitionistic logic could model gradual strengths of proofs; or, introducing them to Kleene's logic (or more generally to a multi-valued logic) would enable us to handle both uncertainty and partial truth.
Another topic for further research would be a parallel study for other numerical theories of uncertainty. For instance, paraconsistent probabilities would lead to a more quantitative framework for reasoning with un certain and conflictual information; in this framework, noticing that Prob( <p ) + Prob( -.�.p) = Prob( <p v -,<p ) + Prob( <pi\ -.�.p) = 1 + Prob( -.�.p0), relaxing the constraint Prob( -.�.p0) = 0 would make Prob( <p ) + Prob( -.�.p ) > 1 possible for some formulas; then one could think of searching for the "least inconsistent" probability dis tribution satisfying a set of constraints, which could be useful for instance when rectifying a set of inconsistent probabilistic data.
